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efficiency affect asymmetric cost behaviour by analysing data for the 1990 to 2016 period on firms listed on
the Australian Securities Exchange. The analysis reveals that, on average, anti-sticky cost behaviour occurs
when firms have limited ability to engage in accrual earnings management to manipulate earnings in the
current year. Further, IC efficiency - particularly human capital efficiency - increases the degree of cost
stickiness. This study also finds that the degree of asymmetric cost behaviour is more pronounced in the post-
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) period than in the pre-IFRS period. The results suggest
that the increased asymmetric cost behaviour in the post-IFRS period derives from higher IC efficiency
relative to the pre-IFRS period. This study presents important implications for external stakeholders because
they can consider the extent of earnings management constraints and the extent of firms' IC efficiency as the
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Do Accruals-earnings Management Constraints and Intellectual Capital Efficiency 
Trigger Asymmetric Cost Behaviour? Evidence from Australia 
 
Summary at a glance 
This study examined whether accruals earnings management constraints and intellectual 
capital (IC) efficiency affect asymmetric cost behaviour. It found that, on average, when 
firms experience accruals earnings management constraints in avoiding unfavourable 
earnings in the current year, they tend to cut slack resources aggressively, leading to 
increased anti-sticky cost behaviour. Further, IC efficiency increases the degree of cost 
stickiness owing to managers’ optimistic expectations about sales. Lastly, asymmetric 
cost behaviour has intensified in the post-International Financial Reporting Standards 















This study examines whether accruals-earnings management constraints and intellectual 
capital (IC) efficiency affect the asymmetric cost behaviour of managers by analysing 
data for the 1990 to 2016 period on firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. 
The analysis results reveal that, on average, anti-sticky cost behaviour occurs when 
firms have limited ability to engage in accrual-earnings management to manipulate 
earnings in the current year. Further, IC efficiency—particularly human capital 
efficiency—increases the degree of cost stickiness. This study also finds that the degree 
of asymmetric cost behaviour is more pronounced in the post-International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) period than in the pre-IFRS period. The results suggest that 
the increased asymmetric cost behaviour in the post-IFRS period derives from higher IC 
efficiency relative to the pre-IFRS period. This study presents important implications 
for external stakeholders because they can consider the extent of earnings management 
constraints and the extent of firms’ IC efficiency as the determinants of asymmetric-cost 
behaviour when assessing firms’ cost behaviour. 
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Over the past decade, the assumption that cost behaviour is asymmetric rather than 
symmetric for activity volume increases and decreases has emerged in management 
accounting literature. Asymmetric cost behaviour was first investigated by Anderson et 
al. (2003), drawing considerable academic attention. Asymmetric cost behaviour arises 
when the cost response to a decrease in activity is smaller or greater than the cost 
response to an increase in activity. Such cost behaviour can be further defined as sticky 
or anti-sticky (Weiss 2010)—costs are termed sticky when the costs rise more with 
increases in activity volume than they fall with decreases of the same amount (Anderson 
et al. 2003), and they are termed anti-sticky when the costs fall more with deceases in 
activity volume than they rise with increases of the same amount (Weiss 2010). 
According to Weiss (2010), a firm with stickier costs shows a greater decline in 
earnings when the activity level falls than a firm with less sticky costs does, as stickier 
costs result in a smaller cost adjustment when activity level declines and, therefore, 
lower cost savings. Lower cost savings result in a greater decrease in earnings, on the 
other hand, a firm with anti-sticky costs shows a smaller decline in earnings when the 
activity volume falls than a firm with sticky costs does, as anti-sticky costs result in a 
greater cost adjustment when activity volume declines and, therefore, a lower decrease 
in earnings. Asymmetric cost behaviour has been explained in several ways, but the 
most common explanation is associated with cost-benefit management capacity 
decisions in the face of changing demand (Cannon 2011). 
    Several studies have investigated asymmetric-cost behaviour finding that 
asymmetric-cost behaviour is seen in firms in the United States (US) (e.g. Anderson et 
al. 2003; Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Bosch and Blandon 2011; Chen et al. 2012); Japan 
(e.g. He et al. 2010), Australia (e.g. Bugeja et al. 2015), as well as in other countries 
(e.g. Porporato and Werbin 2010; Calleja et al. 2006). However, asymmetric-cost 
behaviour is still in its infant stage and it is worth to expand (Banker et al., 2017). 





    Banker et al. (2017) categorised the determinants of cost behaviour into constraints 
(e.g., the existence of adjustment costs, changes in economic activity amount, and debt 
covenants), managers’ incentives (e.g., meeting earnings targets, avoiding earnings 
declines or losses, and ownership types) and expectation biases (e.g., managers’ 
optimistic or pessimistic expectations regarding sales). They stated that the extant 
accounting literature does not comprehensively clarify whether cost stickiness is ‘good’ 
cost stickiness (e.g., it primarily reflects rational or strategic resource management that 
drives future sales to avoid adjustment costs) or ‘bad’ (e.g., it reflects wasteful 
overspending owing to an agency problem). Moreover, Banker et al. (2017) proposed 
extending empirical cost stickiness tests should incorporate the dynamic role of resource 
investment as a driver of future revenue.  
    This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature. First, this study stems from the 
agency theory, which suggests that managerial incentives to gain personal wealth (Chen 
et al. 2012) and/or concerns about meeting or beating earnings benchmarks drive the 
degree of cost stickiness (Kama and Weiss 2013). This study attempts to examine 
whether accruals-earnings management constraints of firms could trigger the 
asymmetric cost behaviour of their management. The rationale behind this investigation 
is that when firms have limited ability to manipulate their earnings to avoid 
unfavourable results, managers could adjust cost by increased cutting down of slack 
resources during a period of declining sales to deliberately increase earnings. Second, 
this study stems from managerial expectations related to sales decline. Studies have 
revealed that factors such as overconfidence influence managers’ resource commitment 
decisions (Chen et al. 2015; Qin et al. 2015) and hubris (Yang 2015). Optimistic 
(pessimistic) expectations in relation to sales declines lead to an increase (decrease) in 
cost stickiness (Anderson et al. 2003). Researchers believe that intellectual capital (IC) 
can yield economic benefits and enhance firm performance (e.g., Joshi et al., 2013; 
Clarke et al., 2011). When IC is efficient, managers could be optimistic regarding future 
earnings and would retain current unutilised resources even in case of decline in sales. 
They might believe that the increase in future sales generated using IC would absorb the 
cost of unutilised resources, and hence, this belief would lead to cost stickiness. 





    This study chose Australia for the following reasons: first, as Bugeja et al. (2015) 
stated, most studies on cost stickiness focus on the United States (US), but significant 
variations exist between Australia and the US as regards market competition, firm 
characteristics, economic structure, governance environment and major industries.      
    Second, Australia, as a country with a balance sheet-oriented conceptual framework, 
common law legal system, high level of shareholder protection and low conformity 
between taxation reporting and financial accounting, differs from the US in terms of 
regulatory and reporting environments (Chalmers et al. 2008, 2011; Lont et al. 2010). 
Unlike in the US, the regulatory environment in Australia allows a more ‘principles-
based’ other than ‘rules-based’ approach in many areas, including compliance with 
accounting standards (Lont et al. 2010). In addition, the latter’s reporting environment 
differs from that of the former in terms of the extent of analyst following and 
institutional setting (Coulton et al. 2005). Analyst following of Australian companies is 
considerably less intensive compared with that of US companies (Habib and Hossain 
2008).  
    Further, Australian institutional investors are less likely than their US counterparts to 
seek to use their voting power to influence management behaviour (Craswell et al. 
1997; Wilson and Wang 2010). Unlike in the US, where earnings manipulation is the 
dominance of equity-based compensation schemes, in Australia, although executive 
stock options are awarded, it has not been a widespread practice (Coulton et al. 2005). 
Around one-third of the CEOs in Australia’s largest firms did not receive any equity-
based compensation (Matolcsy and Wright 2007). These differences could lead to 
variations between the two countries in cost behaviour arising from managerial 
operating decisions.  
    Lastly, Australia provides an ideal ground for IC reporting because it has experienced 
fast economic growth and is also undergoing a transformation with an increasing 
emphasis on new sectors, such as niche manufacturing, information technology, tourism 
and financial services. It is also experiencing a relative decline in its traditionally strong 
areas of mining and agriculture (Guthrie et al. 1999; Abeysekera 2008). Australian 
firms were considered to follow ‘best practices’ in IC reporting (Guthrie et al. 1999; 




2002 disclosed more IC information than Australian companies in 1998 and Hong Kong 
companies in 2002. In a comparison of Australia and Sri Lanka, Abeysekera (2007) 
demonstrated that Australian firms were far more involved in research and 
development, investors in Australia were more willing to support entrepreneurship and 
Australia has more comprehensive laws to protect intellectual property rights. 
Therefore, Australia provides a good context to study IC and its influence on managers’ 
operating decision-making. 
    The purpose of this study is to examine whether accruals-earnings management 
constraints and IC efficiency affect management asymmetric cost behaviour of firms 
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The results reveal the existence of 
anti-sticky cost behaviour when firms have limited ability to apply accruals earnings 
management to manipulate their earnings. The effect intensifies when firms have 
incentives to avoid unfavourable earnings (i.e., earnings declines or losses). When 
managers have strong incentives to avoid earnings decrease or losses but have limited 
ability to engage in accruals-earnings management, they are more willing to cut costs 
aggressively during periods of weak demand. Further, the study finds that IC 
efficiency—particularly human capital efficiency—increases sticky cost behaviour. The 
results demonstrate that under IC efficiency, managers believe that IC will generate 
future revenue. Even there is a decline in sales in current year, but the managers may 
believe decline is temporary and therefore they decide to carry the cost of unutilised 
resources, because they believe the cost absorption will occur during periods of 
increasing demand in the future. In the additional test, this study examines whether the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) could influence 
asymmetric cost behaviour. This study finds that such behaviour is more pronounced in 
the post-IFRS period as the results of higher IC efficiency in the post-IFRS period 
compared with the pre-IFRS period. 
    This paper contributes to the literature on asymmetric-cost behaviour in three 
significant ways. First, although there is a rapid growth in studies on asymmetric-cost 
behaviour, most studies focus on investigating cost stickiness, and few seek to examine 
both sticky and anti-sticky-cost behaviour. This study extends prior research to 




anti-sticky-cost behaviour) in Australian ASX-listed firms. Second, prior research 
provides evidence that corporate governance (Chen et al. 2012), firm size (Via and 
Perego 2014; Anderson et al. 2003), industry (Subramaniam and Weidenmier 2003; Via 
and Perego 2014), labour market (Banker and Chen 2006; Banker et al. 2013), 
employee intensity (Anderson et al. 2003) affect sticky-cost behaviour. This study 
examines whether IC efficiency affects asymmetric-cost behaviour and whether 
increasing IC efficiency influences asymmetric-cost behaviour. Third, agency problem 
has been cited as a cause of asymmetric-cost behaviour (because managers are 
motivated to deliberately manage costs) (e.g. Chen et al. 2012; Kama and Weiss, 2013); 
however, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no empirical study that 
examines how managers deliberately manage costs when firms have limited ability to 
manage earnings using accruals. Thus, this study adds to the literature on asymmetric-
cost behaviour by examining whether asymmetric costs are exhibited when firms have 
limited ability to apply accruals-earnings management.  
    The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review. Section 3 provides hypotheses development of this study. Section 4 describes 
the research design including sample selection and the empirical models. Section 5 
provides the descriptive statistics, correlation of the variables and regression results. 
Section 6 provides the additional tests. Section 7 presents conclusion.  
Literature Review  
Analysing cost behaviour is a critical topic in the management accounting research. 
Anderson et al. (2003) provided the first empirical evidence that costs behave 
asymmetrically in relation to a firm’s activity volume. The study examined asymmetric 
behaviour in selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs using a sample of 7 629 
US firms over a period of 20 years. The study found that SG&A costs increased 0.55 
percent per one percent increase in sales, but decreased only 0.35 percent per one 
percent decrease in sales, on average. The authors labelled this behaviour ‘sticky’. 
Several studies have confirmed Anderson et al.’s (2003) results, finding that US firms 
exhibit significant cost stickiness (e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Bosch and Blandon 




    Cost stickiness has also been investigated in an international context. He et al. (2010) 
observed whether SG&A costs are sticky in Japanese firms using a sample of 1 802 
firms over 25 years. Their results suggested that sticky cost behaviour is present in 
Japanese firms. They found evidence that SG&A costs increased 0.59 percent every one 
percent increase in sales, but fell only 0.45 percent every one percent decrease in sales, 
on average. Özkaya and Yükcü (2011) provided evidence of stickiness in both SG&A 
costs and total operating costs in non-financial Turkish firms, while Porporato and 
Werbin (2010) found the existence of sticky costs in the banking sectors of Argentina, 
Brazil and Canada. Calleja et al. (2006) investigated whether stickiness in operating 
costs is exhibited in four countries: UK, US, German and French firms. The results 
showed that cost stickiness was exhibited in all four countries, but found that the 
stickiness was weaker in US and UK firms relative to French and German firms. Banker 
and Chen (2006) examined whether Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries present different cost behaviour. The authors examined 
the sticky behaviour of operating costs using a sample of 12 666 firms from 19 OECD 
countries over 10 years. The study provided evidence that the degree of cost stickiness 
differs across these 19 countries significantly, and that features of the labour market are 
important determinants of this cross-country difference.  
    A debate on cost stickiness has emerged recently in the literature, regarding the 
possibility that the degree of cost stickiness might vary systematically across different 
cost structures, firm’s characteristics, and the possibility of no stickiness or stickiness 
(e.g. Anderson and Lanen 2009; Weiss 2010; Balakrishnan et al. 2014). Anderson and 
Lanen (2009) explored sticky cost behaviour related to SG&A costs and other types of 
costs, including advertising, labour wages, headcount, research and development, and 
property, plant and equipment. They presented evidence that cost changes are almost 
equally likely to exhibit asymmetries of both the sticky and anti-sticky variety, as they 
are to vary linearly with sales revenue changes. Via and Perego (2014) examined 
asymmetric cost behaviour in small- and medium-sized Italian firms over the period 





    Many studies currently investigate factors that drive asymmetrical cost behaviour. To 
reiterate, the literature mentions three types of drivers of cost stickiness (i.e., 
constraints, managers’ incentives and biases). First, managers choose resource levels 
subject to various constraints (e.g., the existence of adjustment costs, changes in 
economic activity amount, debt covenants). When the constraints (e.g., adjustment 
costs) are larger, managers are more willing to retain unused resources during periods of 
sales decrease. Researchers confirm that constraints play a role in cost management 
decisions. For example, Anderson et al. (2003) used asset intensity and employee 
intensity as proxies for firm-level constraints, and Banker et al. (2013b) used the 
strictness of employment protection laws in OECD countries as a country-level 
constraint proxy. They both found that these management constraints could trigger 
asymmetric cost behaviour. A high level of constraints hinders managerial decision-
making on reducing optional resources in proportion to decreased economic activity 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2014; Banker et al., 2017). 
    Secondly, the degree of cost stickiness is affected by mangers’ incentives (e.g., 
meeting earnings targets, avoiding earnings declines or losses). Chen et al. (2012) 
examined the influence of the agency problem and corporate governance on the degree 
of cost stickiness using the data of US firms over 10 years. The authors found a positive 
relationship between the agency problem and the degree of cost asymmetry. The 
positive relationship between the agency problem and the degree of cost asymmetry is 
mitigated by strong corporate governance, suggesting that strong corporate governance 
can help to mitigate the effect of the agency problem on the degree of cost asymmetry. 
Kama and Weiss (2013) examined whether managers’ incentives of avoiding losses or 
meeting earnings targets influence the degree of costs stickiness. Their results showed 
that when managers face incentives to avoid earnings decreases or losses, or to meet 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, the degree of cost stickiness is reduced, indicating 
that incentives of avoiding losses or meeting earnings targets induce managers expedite 
downward adjustment of unused resources for sales decreases. Bugeja et al. (2015) 
examine the characteristics and determinants of cost stickiness in Australia using a 
sample of Australian listed firms from the period 1990–2010, and found that on 
average, Australian firms exhibit sticky-cost behaviour. They also found that the degree 




managers’ incentives to avoid decreases in earnings or losses reduces sticky-cost 
behaviour.  
    Third, managers’ expectation biases regarding projected sales levels (e.g., their 
optimistic or pessimistic expectations in relation to sales declines) can affect their cost 
behaviour. Banker et al. (2016a) provided evidence that cost stickiness, along with 
conservatism, determines asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Anderson et al. (2003) 
revealed that managerial optimism increases cost stickiness. Banker et al. (2014) 
proxied for expectations using different combinations of sales increase and decrease 
over two consecutive periods. As expected, they found significant cost stickiness in the 
optimistic scenario (two successive periods of sales increase) and significant cost anti-
stickiness in the pessimistic scenario (two successive periods of sales decrease). Banker 
et al. (2016b) use capacity utilisation as a proxy for optimism and found that high 
capacity utilisation is associated with greater cost stickiness. Thus, the empirical 
evidence consistently shows that concurrent demand changes as well as managers’ 
forward-looking demand expectations influence cost management decisions in the 
current period. 
Hypotheses development  
As an extension of the argument that managers’ incentives drive the degree of cost 
stickiness (Bugeja et al. 2005; Kama and Weiss 2013; Banker et al. 2017), this study 
aims to understand whether cost stickiness occurs when firms have limited ability to use 
accruals earnings management to manage earnings in the current year. 
    Apart from cost management, managers have several techniques they can employ to 
avoid earnings decreases, and managers must balance the cost benefit of employing 
different techniques (Palmrose et al. 2004; Desai et al. 2006). Accruals-earnings 
management is a popular choice because it has no first-order effect on cash flows 
(Badertscher 2011; Doukakis 2014; Gunny 2010). However, accruals-earnings 
management has limitations. First, aggressive choices about accruals are at a higher risk 
of regulatory litigation and scrutiny because accrual accounting choices are subject to 
auditor scrutiny, and high levels of accrual manipulation tend to be discovered by 




nature of accruals-earnings management can be problematic because a firm must 
conquer the potential reversal of the previous year’s accruals-earnings management to 
influence the current year’s earnings (Badertscher 2011). This paper aims to examine 
whether accruals constraints affect managers’ incentives to employ cost management to 
avoid earnings declines by deliberately cutting slack resource. Cutting slack resources 
aggressively when there is decline in sales could help managers avoid earnings declines 
or losses when managers have limited ability to utilise the accruals earnings 
management to avoid unfavourable earnings in the current year results. This could result 
in the firm exhibiting asymmetric-cost behaviour in the current year. Given that this 
study is the first to examine accruals-earnings management constraints as a determinant 
of cost asymmetry, the paper states the hypothesis in a null form as follows:  
H1: Accruals-earnings management constraints do not influence the degree of cost 
asymmetry. 
    IC was recognised as being significant and therefore it became desirable to measure 
and report IC as a means of creating and managing a firm’s sustainable competitive 
advantage (Guthrie et al. 2012). In recent decades, the term ‘IC’ has been used as an 
instrument of value creation, which has led to interdisciplinary researchers investigating 
how the capital market has reacted to the potential of IC to create firm value (Dumay 
and Tull, 2007; Murthy and Abeysekera, 2007; Guthrie et al., 2012). Guthrie and Petty 
(2000c) suggest that IC is used as a foundation on which to create and use knowledge to 
enhance firm value, which means that IC refers to the ability to translate organisational 
knowledge into value. IC underlines the importance of using the capital generated by 
resources and human beings to generate products and services in a competitive manner, 
and this is reflected in strong firm performance and the creation of value (Phusavat et al. 
2011; Guthrie et al. 2012; De Silva et al. 2014).  
    Evidence about IC and firms’ financial performance in Australia generally supports 
the belief that IC can enhance their financial performance as well as convey useful 
forward-looking financial information that is relevant to investors evaluating firm value. 
For example, Joshi et al. (2013) examined the relationship between IC, measured by 
Pulic (1998)’s value-added intellectual coefficient (VAIC)TM, and firm financial 




the 2006–2008 period. They found that in all Australian-owned banks, human capital is 
slightly more efficient than structural capital and capital employed. Clarke et al. (2011) 
examined the effect that IC efficiency has on the performance of Australian listed firms 
between 2004 and 2008. They measured IC efficiency using VAICTM and financial 
performance by return on equity, ROA, revenue growth and employee productivity. The 
results indicated a positive relationship between IC efficiency and firm performance, 
particularly in the case of capital employed efficiency (CCE) and human capital 
efficiency (HCE), as well as between HCE and structural capital efficiency (SCE) in the 
prior year and performance in the current year. Kim and Taylor (2014) compared the 
value relevance of the productivity of IC and its components, and the productivity of the 
book value of assets using data from 2006 to 2010 on a sample of 160 Australian listed 
firms. They developed models that drew on publicly available share prices and financial 
information to compute and compare the value relevance of the productivity of IC as 
well as its components of structural and human capital. They measured IC using a 
components-based direct IC measurement on hand-collected annual reports. The results 
showed that the productivity of structural capital, human capital and IC were each 
positively associated with share price, whereas the productivity of total assets at book 
value was insignificant and of tangible assets was negatively significant. The authors 
concluded that the book value of intangible and tangible assets in the balance sheet has 
no value relevance, while intangible assets in the balance sheet represent only a fraction 
of IC. 
    This study assumes that efficient use of IC will enhance firms’ financial performance. 
If firms experience a decrease in sales, managers may prefer to sustain current  
unutilised resources because they feel confident in the increased future firm 
performance that may be generated by IC. This is based on the argument that, when 
managers are optimistic about future performance, they are willing to retain unused 
resources during periods of sales decrease because they believe cost absorption will 
occur during periods of increased firm performance in the future. This tendency to 
retain resources should increase cost stickiness (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker et al. 
2017). This study assumes that IC efficiency could trigger sticky cost behaviour because 
IC could bring future economic benefits to firms. Managers could believe the future 




However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study has examined empirically 
whether IC efficiency and its three components—HCE, SCE and CEE— lead to 
asymmetric cost behaviour in Australia. This paper thus states hypothesis in a null form 
below:  
H2: IC efficiency and its three components (i.e., HCE, SCE and CEE) do not 
influence the degree of cost asymmetry.  
 
Research Design  
Data and Sample Selection  
This study used ASX-listed firms from years 1990-2016. The data were obtained from 
the Morningstar DatAnalysis supplementary by Compustat Global Vantage database2. 
The sample period starts from 1990 because there is no data in the Morningstar 
DatAnalysis database prior 1990. Firms involved in the financial and real estate sectors 
were excluded because they are subject to different reporting requirements. Following 
prior literature (e.g. Anderson et al. 2003; Via and Perego 2014), this study excluded the 
firm-year observations with negative book value of equity, negative total assets, or 
negative or missing sales revenue. This study also trimmed the top and the bottom 1% 
of the sample and excluded sample firms with missing data for the interested and 
control variables (see Empirical model to test the hypotheses). The final sample 
consisted of 10 048 firm-year observations.  
Measurement of Accruals Earnings Management Constrains  
Due to the constrained flexibility of accruals, the ability of managers to manage 
accruals upwards in the current period is limited by accrual management activities in 
previous periods. This paper follows previous studies (Badertscher 2011; Barton and 
Simko, 2002; Zang, 2012), where net operating assets are used as a proxy for the extent 
																																																								
2 Data about employee salaries and wages are not available in DatAnalysis, and this study hence obtained 




of accruals management in previous periods to represent a firm’s ability to manage 
earnings using accruals. If the net operating assets at the beginning of the year are high, 
managers’ abilities to use accruals to manipulate earnings are reduced in the current 
year because the balance sheet and income statement are articulated. Therefore, 
abnormal accruals shown in past earnings can also be shown in net assets, and hence the 
latter are overstated when firms have practiced accruals management previously (Barton 
and Simko, 2002; Zang, 2012). Net operating assets at the beginning of a year (NOA) is 
measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash and cash equivalent, plus total debt 
divided by lagged sales for firm j, at the beginning of year t. Therefore, NOA consists 
mainly of accrual-based measures of net assets used in operations. This proxy is 
consistent with the assumption that overstated net assets are less efficient at generating a 
given level of sales, all else equal (Barton and Simko, 2002). 
Measurement of IC Efficiency  
Following Chen et al. (2005) and Clarke et al. (2011), IC efficiency is calculated using 
Pulic (1998)’s VAIC (i.e., value added intellectual coefficient). VAIC includes three 
components: human capital efficiency, structural capital efficiency, and capital 
employed efficiency. 
To calculate VAIC, the first step is to calculate the ability of a firm to create value 
added (VA) to all stakeholders. Following previous studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2005; Tan, 
Plowman, and Hancock 2008; Clarke et al. 2011), VA can be expressed as follows: 
VA=S-B=NI + W + T +I +DP                      (1) 
where: S is net sales revenues (output); B is cost of goods sold (input); NI is net income 
after tax; W is employee wages and salaries; T is taxes; I is interest expense; and DP is 
depreciation.  
 Human capital efficiency (HCE) 
Human capital (HC) includes the knowledge, experiences, skills, productivity, and 
employees competence (Clarke et al. 2011). HCE is calculated as: 




HC is defined as salaries and wages at a point in time (Pulic, 1998). HCE indicates the 
amount of VA generated by a dollar spent on HC. 
Structural capital efficiency (SCE)  
Structural capital (SC) includes IC items such as strategy, organisational networks, 
patents, and brand names. Pulic (1998) calculates SCE as follows:  
SCE = SC/VA                         (3) 
SC is measured as VA minus HC. SCE, therefore, demonstrates the dollar of SC within 
the firm, for every dollar of value that is added, and as HCE increases, SCE increases.  
 
Capital employed efficiency (CEE)  
Capital employed efficiency (CEE) includes the efficiency that HCE and SCE fail to 
capture. Pulic (1998) argues that IC cannot create value on its own, and so must be 
combined with (physical and financial) capital employed (CE).  
CEE is defined as: 
CEE = VA/CE              (4) 
CE is calculated as total assets minus intangible assets and CEE demonstrates the 
amount of VA created by a dollar spent on CE. 
 
VAIC 
VAIC includes the three individual efficiencies and is the aggregation of the three 
efficiencies: 
VAIC = HCE+ CEE + SCE            (5) 
A greater VAIC represents greater efficiency in IC capitals employed, and thus greater 




Empirical Model to test the hypotheses  
Many empirical studies have measured cost behaviour using the asymmetrical cost 
regression model of Anderson et al. (2003) (e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Chen et al. 
2012; Via and Perego, 2014; Bugeja et al., 2015). This study also relies on the 
Anderson et al. (2003)’s model and extends the model by including two additional 
determinants (i.e., NOA and VAIC), which is presented as below:  
Log !"#$j,t
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+ 𝜀𝑗, 𝑡                                                                                          (6) 
where: Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) 
is coded as 1 when operating revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero 
otherwise. Coefficient β1 measures the percentage increase in operating costs with a one 
percent increase in operating revenue. Because the value of D is 1 when revenue 
decreases, the sum of the coefficients (β1 + β2) measures the percentage change in 
operating costs with a one percent decrease in operating revenue. A positive coefficient 
β2 represents costs anti-stickiness, while a negative coefficient β2 represents costs 
stickiness. 𝐷𝑀j,t,k  is a determinant of cost stickiness, including NOA and VAIC. 
Following Bugeja et al. (2015) and Kama and Weiss (2013), this study included some 
other known determinants in the empirical model. They are gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth rate; revenue decline in the preceding period (SUCC), which is a dummy 
variable coded ‘1’ if revenue in t − 1 is lower than revenue in t − 2, and ‘0’ otherwise; 
property, plant, and equipment intensity (PPE), which is measured by the ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to sales; asset intensity (Asset), the ratio of total assets to 
sales; employee intensity (EMP), the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales; 
managerial incentives to avoid unfavourable earnings (Avoid), which is a dummy 
variable coded ‘1’ if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoidloss is a 
dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero 
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is a dummy variable coded ‘1’ if 
earnings per share of firm j is higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the 
difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Equations (6) includes time and 




time but are constant across the industries, as well as those that differ across industries 
but are constant over time. 
Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of variables for H1 and H2. The mean and 
median of NOA is 1.296 and 0.787, respectively, indicating that the accruals-earnings 
management constraints exist in Australian firms and that these constraints are quite 
high. Further, the mean of VAIC is 0.868 and the median is 1.880. Among the three IC 
components, HCE has the highest mean (mean = 0.930), indicating that human capital 
accounts for the major part of IC in Australia. Similar to Bugeja et al. (2015), this study 
finds that the mean and median of ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) is 0.105 and 0.077, respectively. 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) has mean of 0.109 and median of 0.074. The mean of Avoid is 0.308, 
suggesting that managers have strong incentives to avoid unfavourable earnings (i.e., 
earnings declines or losses). On average, property, plant and equipment account for 
67.8% of sales and employee salaries for 15.9%. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Regression Results 
Regression results for H1 
Table 2 presents the year–industry fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
results for H1. The results reveal that on average, cost stickiness is present in Australia, 
and as shown by the results for the first model in Table 2, the estimated value of β1 is 
0.460 (p-value = 0.000), indicating that operating costs increase 0.460% per 1% 
increase in sales revenues. However, the estimated value of β2 is −0.081 (p-
value = 0.002), suggesting that costs decrease by 0.379% for a 1% decrease in sales 
revenues. The results remain the same on including control variables. The results 
presented for the second model show that the degree of cost stickiness increases with a 




the decreases when revenues reduce in the preceding period (SUCC), offering managers 
the incentive to avoid unfavourable earnings (Avoid). These results are generally 
consistent with those of Bugeja et al. (2015). 
    The third model shown in Table 2 demonstrates that ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*NOA is 
significant and positively associated with ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)  (coefficient = 0.011; p-
value = 0.005), indicating that when firms have limited ability to use accruals to manage 
earnings, managers tend to cut unutilised costs when sales decline and to constrain 
resource expansion when sales increase. This approach results in costs becoming anti-
sticky. This result is also confirmed by including the control variables shown in fourth 
model. Moreover, the results in Table 2 reveal that managers’ incentive to avoid 
unfavourable earnings intensifies the relationship between NOA and the degree of anti-
sticky cost behaviour. The fifth model shows that ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*NOA*Avoid is 
significant and positively associated with ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)  (coefficient = 0.032; p-
value =0.003 ), indicating that when managers have incentives to avoid unfavourable 
earnings but have limited ability to apply accruals-earnings management to manage 
earnings, they are more willing to cut slack resources aggressively to meet current 
earnings targets. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Regression Results for H2 
Table 3 presents the year–industry fixed-effects OLS regression results for H2. The 
results for the first model in Table 3 indicate that on average, total IC efficiency 
increases the degree of cost stickiness, as observed in the negative and significant 
relationship between ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*VAIC and ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) shown for the first model 
of Table 3 (coefficient = −0.022; p-value = 0.002). These results suggest that on 
efficiently employing IC, firms tend to sustain current resources when their sales 
decrease because they may believe IC will enhance future sales and thus the firm will be 
able to absorb cost incurred on unutilised resources owing to the decline in sales3. This 
																																																								
3	H2 assumes that managers are optimistic about future performance when there is efficient IC because 
IC could enhance future performance to absorb the costs incurred during periods of sales decline. To 
confirm that IC could enhance future financial performance, the Pearson correlation analysis is 




optimistic expectation about future performance increases cost stickiness. The result 
holds on including the control variables in the second model shown in Table 3. 
    The results for the third, fourth, and fifth models in Table 3 reveal the influence of IC 
components on the degree of cost stickiness. The results show that HCE and CEE 
increase the degree of cost stickiness, because ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) is significant and negatively 
related to ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*HCE and ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*CEE (coefficient = −0.130; p-
value = 0.000; coefficient = −0.012; p-value = 0.039, respectively), but very weakly 
associated with ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) *D*SCE (coefficient = −0.001; p-value = 0.089). The 
results indicate that on average, the firms that employ human, physical and financial 
capital more efficiently exhibit more sticky costs. Further, human capital increases cost 
stickiness to a greater extent than physical and financial capital. The possible 
explanation for this finding is that physical and financial capital would add value to 
firms more quickly than human capital—for example, firms might use new plant and 
equipment (capital employed) to produce products in a relatively short period, whereas 
human capital might not add value to firms equally quickly. For example, new 
employees may not add value until after gaining experience. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
Additional Tests: The effect of IFRS 
On the first of January 2005, Australia adopted the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), as formulated by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB). While the Australian Accounting Standards Board had been converging the 
Australian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (AGAAP) with IFRS, the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS moved accounting standards towards the introduction of 
fair value as a preferred basis for measuring assets, while recognizing unrealized gains 
and losses through changes in the fair value of assets reported in the income statements, 
along with extensive explanatory disclosures (Australian Institute of Company 
																																																																																																																																																																		
measurements are used: ROA, ROE and revenue growth. The time periods are measured by t + 1, t + 2 
and t + 3, where t ranges from 1990 to 2014, as data were only available up to 2017. The results show that 
VAIC is positively and significantly associated with three future financial performance measurements. 
Specifically, VAIC is positively and significantly associated with ROAt+1 (correlation = 0.5523, p-value = 





Directors (AICD) and Financial Services Institute of Australasia (FINSIA) 2009). The 
adoption of IFRS in Australia changed accountancy practices for intangible assets, 
goodwill, financial and taxation instruments, share-based payments and the impairment 
of non-current assets (see Chalmers et al. 2008, 2011; Haswell and Langfield-Smith 
2008). IFRS-led earnings are considered high quality because they represent a series of 
the best accounting practices in the world, and are more capital-market oriented than 
many domestic accounting standards owing to the adoption of the fair value 
measurement basis (Ding et al. 2007). Moreover, IFRS has enhanced the quality of 
information and the compatibility of financial reporting by promoting a uniform set of 
accounting standards across the globe (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008). Consequently, the 
adoption of IFRS could decrease costs for investors when comparing firms from 
different markets and nations, helping to boost international investment and integrate 
capital markets (Covrig et al. 2007).  
    The literature typically documents conflicting evidence about the effect of IFRS on 
earnings quality in Australia. Chalmers et al. (2008) examined whether the value 
relevance of reported intangibles differs between pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods. They 
found evidence that IFRS generally conveys incremental useful information to investors 
about goodwill, while AGAAP provides incremental information to investors in relation 
to identifiable intangibles. However, Goodwin et al. (2008) and Clarkson et al. (2011) 
did not find supporting evidence on IFRS adoption leading to enhanced value relevance 
of accounting information. Lai et al. (2013) examined the change of accruals reliability 
in the pre- and post-IFRS periods during 1998–2008 for ASX listed firms. They found 
that accrual reliability declined significantly after mandatory IFRS implementation. Lai 
et al. (2013) examined the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on accounting 
conservatism in Australia. They found that IFRS adoption has led to decreased 
asymmetric timeliness, but to increased other conservatism measurements. The authors 
conclude that the question regarding the long-term effects of IFRS on financial 
reporting conservatism remains unanswered. Jin et al. (2015) investigated the quality of 
matching between contemporaneous revenues and expenses for the pre-IFRS period 
(2001–2005) and post-IFRS period (2006–2011). The authors found that the revenue–




revenues and expenses increased in the latter. Their results suggest that IFRS enhanced 
the quality of matching between revenues and expenses.  
   This section attempts to add value to the existing conflicting evidence regarding the 
effect of IFRS on earnings quality in Australia. This section aims to examine how IC 
efficiency and earnings quality change from pre-IFRS to post-IFRS. Moreover, Bugeja 
et al. (2015) examined the characteristics and determinants of cost stickiness in 
Australia using a large sample of Australian listed firms from 1990 to 2010. They found 
some preliminary evidence that the extent of cost asymmetry increased after the 
adoption of IFRS. However, they failed to determine how the accounting policy 
changes caused by the adoption of IFRS would in aggregate affect the degree of cost 
stickiness. This section extends Bugeja et al.’s (2015) study to examine whether the 
increased cost asymmetry behaviour in the post-IFRS period was caused by changes in 
IC efficiency and earnings management constraints. 
 
     To provide insights into changes in cost stickiness, this section includes an 
interaction term between a Post dummy and cost stickiness in the regression analysis, 
where Post is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for firm-years after the 
introduction of IFRS (i.e., from 2006–2016), and 0 otherwise. 
    Table 4 Panel A presents the descriptive analysis of NOA, IC and its three 
components before and after IFRS adoption. The results show that IC efficiency 
increased significantly after the adoption of IFRS: the mean of VAIC (mean =0.601) 
before IFRS adoption is lower than that (mean =1.339) after adoption (t-value 
=−11.120; p-value = 0.000). As regards the three components of IC, CEE increased 
significantly (t-value =−34.294; p-value = 0.000), followed by HCE (t-value =−11.012; 
p-value = 0.000), however, SCE has decreased (t-value =2.011; p-value = 0.022). NOA 
did not change significantly between the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods (t-value 
=−0.832; p-value =0.203). 
    Table 4 Panel B shows the regression results of the effect of IFRS on the degree of 
cost stickiness. The first model of Table 4 Panel B shows that the ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) is 




value = 0.039), indicating that cost stickiness is more pronounced in the post-IFRS 
period. Further, the results presented in Table 4 Panel B show that 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*Post* NOA is very weakly significant and positively related to 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) (coefficient = 0.012; p-value = 0.084) in second model. The results of 
third model in Panel B indicate that on average, IC efficiency increases the degree of 
cost stickiness more in the post-IFRS period, revealed by the result that the interaction 
variable ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*Post*VAIC is significant and negatively associated with 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) (coefficient = −0.015; p-value = 0.000). Given the more efficient 
employment of IC in the post-IFRS period (as shown in Panel A), after the adoption of 
IFRS, managers are more willing to retain current resources when their sales decrease in 
the post-IFRS period. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
Conclusion 
The literature has examined the determinants of asymmetric cost behaviour (e.g., 
Anderson et al. 2003; Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Bosch and Blandon 2011; Chen et al. 
2012; Bugeja et al. 2015). However, few studies have examined whether accruals-
earnings management constraints and IC efficiency affect management asymmetric cost 
behaviour and whether such behaviour changed after adoption of IFRS in Australia. 
    This study finds that, when managers have the incentive to avoid unfavourable 
earnings in the current year but have limited ability to use accruals-earnings 
management to manipulate earnings, they tend to cut slack resources more aggressively 
to avoid unfavourable earnings, which leads to anti-sticky cost behaviour. Moreover, 
the results of this study show that IC efficiency triggers sticky cost behaviour. The 
reason is that managers may believe that IC would generate future revenue and that the 
decline in sales is temporary; therefore, they would decide to carry the cost of unutilised 
resources, aiming to absorb these unutilised resources during periods of increasing 
demand in the future. Among the three IC efficiencies, HCE increases sticky cost the 
most, followed by CEE. This study further examined whether asymmetric cost 




behaviour was more pronounced in the post-IFRS period and this increase was because 
of higher IC efficiency in this period than in the pre-IFRS period. 
    This study provides important implications for users of financial statements (e.g., 
investors, financial analysts, auditors, creditors and standard setters) to understand 
managers’ decision-making about cost management. They would understand that under 
different circumstances, managers’ decision on adjusting slack resources owing to 
decline in demand could vary. Further, users of financial statements could consider the 
IC efficiency of companies in developing their prediction models to evaluate future firm 
performance. 
    This study is subject to several limitations. First, like other empirical research, results 
may suffer from endogeneity problems. Although this paper used time industry effects 
models to control for the unobservable confounding variables that differ across time and 
industry, this study could not fully control for all other unobservable variables that 
influence explanatory variables. Second, this paper used total operating costs: this 
measure of costs has been used in many studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2012; Weiss 2010; Via 
and Perego 2014; Bugeja et al. 2015; Calleja et al. 2006); however, SG&A cost is the 
common approach in the cost asymmetry literature. Therefore, findings of this paper 
should be interpreted cautiously. Third, H2 of this study assumes that managers are 
optimistic about future performance when firms have efficient IC because they believe 
that IC could enhance future financial performance. Although this study examines the 
association between IC efficiency and future financial performance, it fails to find a 
proxy for CEO optimism. This presents an avenue for future research to determine the 
proxy of CEO optimism (e.g., CEO overconfidence) and examine the relationship 
between IC efficiency and CEO optimism to support H2 of this study. Future research 
could also investigate the influence of other incentives of managers on cost asymmetry, 
such as management compensation, managerial risk taking. Future study could apply 
different research methodology to investigate manager motivations and attitudes that 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observations  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Δlog(Cost) 10 048 0.105 0.077 0.416 -4.656 5.507 
Δlog(Sales) 10 048 0.109 0.074 0.516 -5.105 12.049 
D 10 048 0.312 0.000 0.463 0.000 1.000 
SUCC 10 048 0.220 0.000 0.414 0.000 1.000 
GDP 10 048 3.093 3.500 1.188 -0.400 5.000 
Asset 10 048 19.246 19.092 2.280 12.628 25.812 
PPE 10 048 0.678 0.278 2.070 0.009 7.432 
EMP 10 048 0.159 0.111 0.653 0.024 0.873 
Avoid 10 048 0.308 0.000 0.190 0.000 1.000 
VAIC 10 048 0.868 1.880 3.348 -7.576 35.597 
HCE 10 048 0.930 0.987 1.153 -6.263 34.589 
CEE 10 048 0.781 0.544 0.826 -1.066 4.314 
SCE 10 048 -0.843 0.007 2.539 -7.698 23.675 
NOA 10 048 1.296 0.787 1.813 -0.033 17.174 
Note: Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) is coded as 1 when operating 
revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero otherwise. GDP is gross domestic product growth rate. 
SUCC is revenues declines in the preceding period, which is dummy variable and coded as ‘1’ if revenue in t-1 is 
lower than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. PPE is Property, plant, and equipment intensity, which is measured by the 
ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales; Asset intensity (Asset) is measured by the ratio of total assets to sales. 
EMP is employee intensity, which is measured by the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales. Avoid is managerial 
incentives to unfavourable earnings, it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and 0 
otherwise. Where Avoidloss is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero 
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share 
higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. NOA is 
net operating assets, which are measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash, and cash equivalent plus total debt 
divided by lagged sales in t-1. HCE is human capital efficiency. SCE represents structural capital efficiency. CEE is 





























Table 2: Regression results for H1 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 0.038 0.044 0.009 0.003 0.010 
 (0.336) (0.371) (0.760) (0.910) (0.722) 
Δlog(Sales) 0.460*** 0.464*** 0.747*** 0.745*** 0.744*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.270*** -0.611*** -0.625*** 




  (0.023)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*GDP  -0.021  -0.067
** -0.074** 
















  (0.017)  (0.014) (0.012) 
NOA   -0.006
** -0.007** -0.007** 
   (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) 
Δlog(Sales)*NOA   0.242*** 0.249*** 0.242*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*NOA   0.011
*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
   (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*NOA*Avoid     0.032
*** 
     (0.003) 
Year effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs  10 048 10 048 10 048 10 048 10 048 
Adj R-squared 0.3729 0.4244 0.5543 0.5604 0.5614 
p statistics in parentheses 
  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1






∗ 𝐷𝑀j,t,k ∗ 𝐷j,t,k ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1
+ 𝜀𝑗, 𝑡 
where Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) is coded as 1 when operating 
revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero otherwise. GDP is gross domestic product growth rate. 
SUCC is revenues declines in the preceding period, which is dummy variable and coded as ‘1’ if revenue in t-1 is 
lower than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. PPE is Property, plant, and equipment intensity, which is measured by the 
ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales; Asset intensity (Asset) is measured by the ratio of total assets to sales. 
EMP is employee intensity, which is measured by the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales. Avoid is managerial 
incentives to unfavourable earnings, it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and 0 
otherwise. Where Avoidloss is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero 
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share 




net operating assets, which are measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash, and cash equivalent plus total debt 
divided by lagged sales in t-1. 
 
 
Table 3: Regression results for H2 
Vairables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 0.040 0.071 0.066 0.053 0.045 
 (0.495) (0.221) (0.158) (0.253) (0.359) 
Δlog(Sales) 0.413*** 0.398*** 0.464*** 0.471*** 0.464*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D -0.024** -0.034*** -0.093*** 0.093*** -0.064*** 
 (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*SUCC  0.170
*** 0.139*** 0.321*** 0.073* 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.077) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*GDP  -0.034 0.018 -0.119
*** -0.026 
  (0.377) (0.528) (0.000) (0.367) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*PPE  -0.009
** -0.012** -0.011*** -0.011** 
  (0.011) (0.014) (0.000) (0.013) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*EMP  -0.013
*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*Asset  -0.104
*** -0.077*** -0.013 -0.074*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.180) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*Avoid  0.066
* 0.101** 0.161*** 0.019* 
  (0.070) (0.045) (0.000) (0.089) 
VAIC 0.003*** 0.005***    
 (0.003) (0.000)    
Δlog(Sales)*VAIC 0.068*** 0.069***    
 (0.000) (0.000)    
Δlog(Sales)*D*VAIC -0.022*** -0.038***    
 (0.002) (0.000)    
HCE   0.116
***   
   (0.000)   
Δlog(Sales)*HCE   0.165
***   
   (0.000)   
Δlog(Sales)*D*HCE   -0.130
***   
   (0.000)   
CEE    0.179
***  
    (0.000)  
Δlog(Sales)*CEE    0.079
***  
    (0.000)  
Δlog(Sales)*D*CEE    -0.012
**  
    (0.039)  
SCE     0.001
* 




Table 3 continued  
Vairables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Δlog(Sales)*SCE     0.005 
     (0.189) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*SCE     -0.001
* 
     (0.089) 
Year effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs 10 048 10 048 10 048 10 048 10 048 
Adj R-squared 0.3438 0.3762 0.4988 0.4804 0.425 
p statistics in parentheses 
  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1






∗ 𝐷𝑀j,t,k ∗ 𝐷j,t,k ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1
+ 𝜀𝑗, 𝑡 
where Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) is coded as 1 when operating 
revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero otherwise. GDP is gross domestic product growth rate. 
SUCC is revenues declines in the preceding period, which is dummy variable and coded as ‘1’ if revenue in t-1 is 
lower than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. PPE is Property, plant, and equipment intensity, which is measured by the 
ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales; Asset intensity (Asset) is measured by the ratio of total assets to sales. 
EMP is employee intensity, which is measured by the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales. Avoid is managerial 
incentives to unfavourable earnings, it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and 0 
otherwise. Where Avoidloss is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero 
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share 
higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. HCE is 
human capital efficiency. SCE represents structural capital efficiency. CEE is capital employed efficiency. VAIC is 





































Table 4: Regression results for additional test (the effect of IFRS) 
Panel A: descriptive statistics of interested variables pre and post IFRS  
 
Pre-IFRS (Year 1990 
to 2005) (N=4721) 
Post-IFRS (Year 
2006 to 2016) 
(N=5327) 
T-test 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-value p-value 
NOA 1.283 1.766 1.313 1.847 -0.832 0.203 
VAIC 0.601 3.358 1.339 3.277 -11.120*** 0.000 
HCE 0.805 0.903 1.073 1.495 -11.012*** 0.000 
SCE -0.724 2.576 -0.825 2.440 2.011** 0.022 
CEE 0.520 0.784 1.091 0.885 -34.294*** 0.000 
Panel B: regression results 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 0.045 0.010 0.083 
 (0.363) (0.568) (0.152) 
Δlog(Sales) 0.465*** 0.551*** 0.413*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D -0.048*** -0.064*** -0.093*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*SUCC 0.068* 0.297*** 0.303*** 
 (0.095) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*GDP -0.041 -0.052 -0.127*** 
 (0.161) (0.102) (0.002) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*PPE -0.020*** -0.020* -0.001*** 
 (0.004) (0.094) (0.001) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*EMP -0.002*** -0.016*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*Asset -0.069*** -0.036*** -0.097*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*Avoid 0.120** 0.124** 0.152** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.014) 
Post 0.004 0.043 0.010 
 (0.936) (0.190) (0.866) 
Δlog(Sales)*Post 0.303** 0.432*** 0.373** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.034) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*Post -0.013** -0.030*** -0.060*** 
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) 
NOA  0.007
**  
  (0.023)  
Δlog(Sales)*NOA  0.174***  
  (0.003)  
Δlog(Sales)*D*NOA  0.021***  
  (0.000)  
Δlog(Sales)*Post*NOA  0.127
*  




Table 4 Panel B continued 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*Post*NOA  0.012
*  
  (0.084)  
VAIC   0.005
*** 
   (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*VAIC   0.157*** 
   (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*VAIC   -0.067*** 
   (0.000) 
Δlog(Sales)*Post*VAIC   0.053
** 
   (0.032) 
Δlog(Sales)*D*Post*VAIC   -0.015
*** 
   (0.000) 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Number of obs 10 048 10 048 10 048 
Adj R-squared 0.4251 0.5698 0.3902 
p statistics in parentheses 
  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1






∗ 𝐷𝑀j,t,k ∗ 𝐷j,t,k ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1
+ 𝜀𝑗, 𝑡 
where Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) is coded as 1 when operating 
revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero otherwise. GDP is gross domestic product growth rate. 
SUCC is revenues declines in the preceding period, which is dummy variable and coded as ‘1’ if revenue in t-1 is 
lower than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. PPE is Property, plant, and equipment intensity, which is measured by the 
ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales; Asset intensity (Asset) is measured by the ratio of total assets to sales. 
EMP is employee intensity, which is measured by the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales. Avoid is managerial 
incentives to unfavourable earnings, it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and 0 
otherwise. Where Avoidloss is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero 
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share 
higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. NOA is 
net operating assets, which are measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash, and cash equivalent plus total debt 
divided by lagged sales in t-1. HCE is human capital efficiency. SCE represents structural capital efficiency. CEE is 
capital employed efficiency. VAIC is the aggregation of HCE, SCE, and CEE. Post is dummy variable that equals 1 
if year from 2006-2016, ‘0’ otherwise.  
 
 
